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Me and My Body: The Relevance of the Distinction for the 
Difference between Withdrawing Life Support and 
Euthanasia 
Andrew McGee, Ph.D 
In a paper1 which has recently attracted discussion,2 David Shaw has attempted to criticise the 
distinction the law has drawn between withdrawing and withholding life sustaining measures on the 
one hand, and euthanasia on the other, by claiming that the body of a terminally ill patient should 
be seen as akin to life support.  Shaw compares two cases that we might, at least at first, regard as 
distinct, and argues that they are not. In the first case, Adam, who is dying of lung cancer, is 
connected to a ventilator, and requests to be disconnected. In the second case, Brian, also dying of 
cancer, is not connected to anything, and so he requests his doctor to provide him with a lethal 
injection. In the first case, Shaw contends, Adam is being kept alive by a ventilator. In the second 
case, Brian is being kept alive by his body. When Adam requests to be disconnected from the 
ventilator, and Brian requests a lethal drug, both are doing so on the basis that their autonomy is 
being violated. ‘Brian’s lungs, like Adam’s ventilator, are violating his autonomy by prolonging his life 
against his will.’3 In this way, a request for a lethal injection can be seen as analogous to – indeed an 
instance of – a request to have life support, such as an artificial ventilator, removed. If this is right, ‘it 
is clear that there is no substantive moral difference between turning off a ventilator...and providing 
or administering a lethal drug’.4  
At first glance, this does of course appear to be a rather startling claim. We do not normally regard 
our body as distinct from us in the way that we regard other physical objects as distinct from us. But 
in perhaps a familiar move – familiar, at least, to those of us who have received any philosophical 
training – Shaw attempts to support the claim with arguments about the relationship between the 
body and the mind. We typically distinguish ourselves from our bodies, and we can refer to ‘our 
body’ in a way that seems to imply that we are not identical with our bodies. We are our minds. It is 
essential to note the generality of this claim. The claim is about all of us, and not merely about Brian 
and Adam in their terminally ill phase. Shaw states: 
The new perspective requires us to accept that we as persons are not identical with our 
bodies (for more on the mind/body problem, See Robinson) (Italics added)5 
Shaw’s position has been recently criticised by Jacob Busch and Raffaele Rodogno and Hugh 
McLachlan,6 and Shaw has responded.7 It is not my intention here to weigh into their discussion. 
While sympathetic to the criticisms of Busch and Rodogno, I do not believe they successfully refute 
Shaw’s position, because they do not confront Shaw’s dualism. In order to refute it, it is necessary to 
undermine the dualism on which Shaw’s position is based, and it seems  to me that, while Busch and 
Rodogno make some important criticisms of Shaw’s arguments, those criticisms would not rule out 
alternative ways of presenting the position. Similarly, while McLachlan questions whether persons 
can be identified with their minds or their bodies, he states that he is ‘happy to go along with *Shaw+ 
in accepting that Brian’s body can be regarded as a provider of unwanted life support’.8  McLachlan 
thereby prevents himself from undercutting Shaw’s dualism and so fails to reach the heart of Shaw’s 
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paper. In this paper, I will therefore attempt to present different arguments which, if successful, 
would show that Shaw’s position cannot be defended, drawing on some recent work in the 
philosophy of psychology that, so far, does not appear to be well known to lawyers and medical 
ethicists.  
If the body were a form of life support, would the distinction between withholding/withdrawal 
and euthanasia be suspect? 
Let us, to begin with, assume that Shaw is right that our bodies can be seen as a form of life support. 
It does not follow from this that the distinction between withdrawing life-prolonging treatment and 
euthanasia is suspect, as he claims. First, pace Shaw, it is not Brian’s lungs ‘who’ is violating Adam’s 
autonomy, for it makes no sense to speak of a part of one’s body, or a thing, as ‘violating autonomy’ 
in this sense. Only people can ‘violate’ Adam’s autonomy by, for example, refusing to disconnect him 
from the ventilator after he has requested it, and after they connected him to it in the first place. 
There is therefore a vital difference between Brian’s lungs and the ventilator – or, more accurately, 
the doctors controlling the ventilator.  
Second, given the distinction that Shaw draws between Brian and his body, it is not accurate to 
distinguish Brian’s circumstances from Adam’s circumstances by saying that Adam is being kept alive 
by a ventilator, whereas Brian is being kept alive by his body. Rather, Adam is being kept alive by 
both his body and a ventilator, while Brian is merely being kept alive by his body. For however 
dependent Adam is on the ventilator, he is also dependent on his body for the carrying out of other 
functions, such as the digestion of food, and the cleaning of his blood by his kidneys, etc.  It follows 
from both of these points that, even if Shaw were right, someone might nonetheless distinguish 
withdrawal from euthanasia by claiming that, in withdrawal, the body is dependent on technological 
intervention in the form of the provision of a ventilator, whereas in euthanasia it is not. Dependence 
on a machine or a manufactured object means that a person’s life is being prolonged artificially, by 
the application of technology, and, in short, by other people, whereas dependence merely on one’s 
body means only that one simply remains alive, but one’s life is not being prolonged by others and 
by the application of any technology. In this respect, a crucial difference remains between the cases 
of withdrawal of life-prolonging measures and euthanasia,9 even if we accepted Shaw’s account. 
One could still insist that, in the case of withdrawal, we would at that point merely cease the 
artificial prolongation of the patient’s life, and allow the patient to die. By contrast, with euthanasia, 
if we provide a lethal injection, we would be actively overriding the natural sequence of events, not 
by prolonging the patient’s life, but rather by cutting it short.10 We would therefore be killing the 
patient. Whatever one thinks of the killing/letting die distinction – whether one thinks it is morally 
relevant or not – the fact remains that one could still draw that distinction, yet Shaw believes that 
his arguments show that the distinction is undermined.11 To the extent, however, that it remains 
possible to draw the distinction, it seems that the case he makes for “collapsing the distinction” 12 
fails.  
Can the body ever be regarded as a form of life support? 
But is Shaw at least right to claim that the body can be conceived as a form of life support?  There 
are other reasons for doubting so. There is a fundamental difference between the ventilator, and 
Brian’s body, that precludes Shaw’s attempt to draw an analogy between them. The correct analogy 
would be between the ventilator, and part of Brian’s body, for example, his lungs, rather than the 
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body itself. And, of course, nobody would deny that Brian is not identical to a part of himself, to one 
or more of his organs. The mind/body dualism that Shaw espouses, where Brian is not his body, but 
his mind, is wholly unnecessary to make this point. But notice that, in that case, the analogy Shaw 
wants to draw between withholding and withdrawing and euthanasia would no longer be available. 
For he would then have to say not that Brian’s body is his life support but, say, Brian’s lung, for the 
ventilator is performing the function of his lungs, not his body. But the problem with this is that it 
makes no sense to say that Brian’s lung is keeping him alive. The reason it makes sense to speak of a 
ventilator (as opposed to a lung) as keeping Brian alive is that it replaces a malfunctioning organ and, 
as it were, stands proxy for that malfunctioning organ. Without the ventilator standing proxy for the 
malfunctioning organ, the patient would die, and so in that sense, it is meaningful to describe the 
ventilator as a form of life-support. But when the organs are functioning, there is no support 
mechanism in place, and so no reason to pick one organ any more than another. In short, life-
support simply does not play an analogous role to the body, but replaces a part or more than one 
part of it that has ceased functioning. While the ventilator can be compared to the lung, and can be 
said to be keeping Brian alive where the lung is failing, the same thing cannot be said of the lung 
itself when it is functioning properly – for it is every organ together that is keeping Brian alive, not 
any particular organ.  
It might be thought, however, that Shaw has this point covered by saying that it is Brian’s body that 
is keeping him alive. But the point is that once it is conceded that no particular part of Brian is 
keeping him alive, but that all his organs, put together, are doing so, the analogy with life support 
machines such as ventilators collapses, for these are analogous not the body as a whole, but to a 
part of it, whose function they replace. Moreover, to say that all his organs are keeping him alive, or 
that his body is keeping him alive, is really just to say that he is alive. Unlike in the case of a 
ventilator, it really makes no sense to say that his body keeps him alive if that means anything other 
than that he is alive. To say that his body is keeping him alive is to invite a contrast the other part of 
which is obscure, and so it is unclear what it is that we are really saying.   
However, Shaw might now appeal to his dualism to respond to this contention, so it is to his dualism 
that we must now turn. Am I different from my body such that it is meaningful to say that, in the 
case of Brian, his body is keeping him alive? The point Shaw seeks to make seems clear enough. 
Neither Adam nor Brian, nor, indeed, anyone can be identified with their bodies, and, once this 
conclusion is accepted, it seems as though Shaw must be right to claim that the body is, in essence, 
in no different a position from artificial life support. But the question is whether I am different from 
my body in the way that a life-support machine is different from me – am I a separate entity from 
my body?  
Although dualism13 is not a position which, in the wake of the onslaught on it in the 20th century, is in 
favour today, the mere fact that such a position is out of favour is not of itself sufficient to discredit 
the claim that my body is, in the cases discussed, a form of life support. Further, given that some 
writers seem to be drawn to dualism over and over again, it is necessary to explain the attractions of 
the position as well as to provide a convincing demonstration of its untenability. Fortunately, recent 
work in philosophy can assist us here to show what is right and what is wrong in the position that 
Shaw advocates. 
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Shaw’s mind/body dualism 
The first point to note is that Shaw is not necessarily committed to a strong dualism under which I 
might survive the death of my body, though he does at one stage flirt with the idea when he states 
that ‘we can all imagine existing without our bodies’.14 For reasons we shall see later, this claim is 
untenable, but it is possible to detect a more modest position in Shaw’s account, which would 
accept the demise of the self with the demise of the brain. This position might seem more plausible. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that he claims that Adam and Brian are not identical with their bodies, 
and concludes from this that their bodies are akin to life support, he is committed to an untenable 
dualism even in this more modest form. The claim that Adam and Brian are not identical with their 
bodies does not, pace Shaw, entail dualism, and so the conclusion that their bodies are akin to life 
support cannot be sustained. It is not important to debate here whether Shaw espouses mind/body 
dualism, or person/body, self-body, I/body, dualism.  Shaw uses a number of these categories, 
sometimes referring to Adam and Brian as ‘person’ and sometimes as ‘mind’. At one point he 
expressly states:  
Brian is not his body; he is his mind.15 
Elsewhere, however, he states that “we as persons are not identical with our bodies” and adds “for 
more on the mind/body problem, see Robinson”.16 This suggests that he sees ‘mind’ and ‘person’ as 
synonymous or intersubstitutable, which is, of course, a matter for debate. However, we need not 
press this particular issue. Whether the term ‘mind’ or ‘person’ is used, Shaw’s claim is simply that 
Adam and Brian are not identical to their bodies, and his form of dualism can be discussed while 
remaining neutral about whether the category he distinguishing from ‘body’ is ‘mind’ or ‘person’ or 
‘I’ or ‘self’, etc.  Robinson’s article, to which Shaw refers, is an article in an encyclopaedia of 
philosophy, and one might have thought that an area so significant in the history of philosophy 
might have required a little more in depth discussion.  Be that as it may, it is important to consider 
the arguments he offers in his paper.  
Shaw’s basic argument is shortly stated. He points out that the definition of the death of a person is 
brain death, and draws from this the following conclusion:  
If someone’s brain stops working forever, we no longer refer to him or her17 as a person; this 
must mean that the body is, in a sense, a life-support system for the person. While this 
system could continue to function after brain death as the body of a dead person, the body 
is not the same thing as the patient, and in this vital sense, Brian is not his body; he is his 
mind.18 
Much here hangs on the words “in a sense”, for he leaves it opaque in what sense the body really is 
a life-support system, given that we do not, for example, normally think of the body as a machine 
supporting life, but as itself a form of a life. Does one form of life – the body – support another, the 
so-called mind? How do these two forms of life interact? More fundamentally, the argument faces 
the following problem.  “Brain dead” does not of course mean dead. If it did, then we do not have a 
body when the patient is brain dead. We have a corpse. It is the corpse that is not the same thing as 
a patient, rather than their body. But we know that “brain dead” just means ‘dead’ for medical 
purposes. That being so, it is of course appropriate to use the term ‘body’ rather than ‘corpse’ when 
referring to a person as brain dead. But then Shaw is too quick to say that “we no longer refer to 
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‘him’ as a person”, for this claim trades on an ambiguity between dead and brain dead. To say of 
someone who is brain dead that we no longer refer to him as a person is a linguistic 
recommendation on Shaw’s part, stemming from his own philosophical and substantive inclinations, 
rather than a neutral point. If the patient were dead, it would not be necessary to add the word 
‘brain’ to ‘dead’, which invites the distinction between dead in one sense but alive in another.19 Of 
course, it is possible to debate whether it is meaningful to call a person who is brain dead “a person” 
but it is a matter to be debated, rather than merely assumed, for we do not treat the body as a 
corpse at this point, and it is important not to project back onto the body the distinctions we make 
in the case of a corpse. It is meaningful to say, of a brain dead mother who gives birth, that ‘she gave 
birth’, and the use of the personal pronoun here is a criterion for whether or not to describe the 
mother as a person, regardless of philosophical definitions of personhood.20 Nonetheless, the crux of 
Shaw’s argument is that we cannot call a brain dead person a ‘person’ because a person “is his 
mind”, and this is, of course, a contestable claim. We will now expose the contestable nature of this 
claim. 
What is the relationship between me and my mind? 
If Brian is his mind, does it make sense to say that he has a mind? How can he be something he has? 
We often do speak of having a mind. We speak, for example, of a person having a mind of his own, 
of having a tidy mind or a dirty mind.21 But if, as Shaw contends, I am my mind, such talk is puzzling. 
How can I have something that I am? If I am the mind, when we say that I have a mind of my own, 
does that mean that my mind has a mind of its own? Shaw does not pay attention to the 
consequences that follow from his identification of Brian with Brian’s mind, but, once these are 
exposed, it seems to reduce his position to an absurdity, for these ways of speaking – my mind has a 
mind of its own – would have to be intelligible on Shaw’s account. It would seem as though we 
would have to revise much of our way of speaking of Shaw were right, and that, of course, is an 
indication that his analysis has gone awry. ‘Mind’ is not synonymous with human being or person, 
and so cannot be identified, as Shaw claims, with Brian. Rather, as Anthony Kenny noted: 
To say that I have a mind is to say that I have the capacity to acquire intellectual abilities of 
various kinds, such as the mastery of language and the possession of objective information.22 
Possession of a mind is possession of an array of capacities and their exercise that we call ‘mental’, 
such as the capacity to think, imagine, emote, and speak.  And it is I, the human being, not my mind, 
who bears these capacities. 
Developing Kenny’s insight, Peter Hacker has argued that, outside philosophy, we do not really speak 
of anything called ‘the mind’ but rather use the word ‘mind’ in other ways, as, for example, when we 
speak about having a sound mind, or of having a mind of our own, of having things on one’s mind, or 
having something at the back of one’s mind.23 Hacker concludes from this that although the ‘mind’ is 
real, it is not an entity. Talk of the mind is really a figure of speech (but not a fiction), and is a way of 
referring to me, and qualities that I have, in particular, to an array of capacities that we call ‘mental’. 
To be of two minds to do something, for example, is simply to be unsure about what to do. Here 
Hacker echoes Strawson, who claimed that persons are one two-sided thing, rather than two one-
sided things.24 Our ‘minds’ are really a shorthand way of referring to a sophisticated repertoire of 
capacities possessed by the spatio-temporal continuant that is the human organism. The difficulty 
with Shaw’s view is that he thinks it makes sense to imagine existing without our bodies: 
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...we can all imagine existing without our bodies...25 
But this claim harbours a well known confusion between imaginability and logical possibility. It is not 
clear what it would mean to exist without a body, and the claim that we can ‘imagine’ existing 
without a body does not show that existence without a body is logically possible, any more than the 
scenes depicted in The Terminator movies show that time travel is logically possible either.  It is one 
thing to remain lucid while our bodies fade and fail, but it is quite another to conceive of existing 
outside our bodies, fairytales and paranormal narratives notwithstanding.  
Another option is to identify the mind with the brain. Although Busch and Rodogno accuse Shaw of 
taking this view, he denies it in his response,26 and it is clear that he does not espouse the view that 
the mind is the brain, though he does say that ‘people... are their brain activity’.27 Quite how I can be 
identified with a part of me (my brain activity) is not made clear. The most that can be said is that 
brain activity is an enabling condition for me, the human being, to be conscious. But that is a 
different thing entirely from saying that I am my brain activity.  It is you, not your brain activity, who 
falls in love, studies hard at college, works late into the night, goes on holiday, or cooks dinner. Once 
we recognise that the mind is a way of referring to a sophisticated array of capacities possessed by 
the human being, the proximity Shaw draws between the mind and the brain comes to seem 
exaggerated.28 So much for the relationship between me and my mind.  
What is the relationship between me and my body? 
What, then, of the relationship between me and my body? We do speak of having bodies, and this 
seems to imply I am something different from it, just as I am something different from my mind. But 
in what sense do I have a body? What does ‘having’ mean here? Is it used in a possessory or 
ownership sense? It seems difficult to conceive of it in that way, for it isn’t possible to alienate my 
body, except metaphorically. Normally, with things I possess, it makes sense to speak of my 
possessing them because I can give them away or sell them. They are transferrable between people. 
Because they are transferrable or alienable, it is informative to say that I have them because I may 
not, of course, have had them at all. ‘I’ve got the jewels’ is informative because it is possible that I 
may not have had the jewels. But this is not the case with my body. Another person can sell me into 
slavery, but they sell me, not my body. In the sense in which we speak of someone selling their body, 
that does not leave them bodiless.29 
Hacker has argued that when we speak of having a body, we do so only as a way of referring to 
bodily characteristics. Thus we speak of someone having a nice or attractive body, a bruised body, a 
sunburnt body, and the like. Used in this sense, it is a way of referring to characteristics that I have. 
For example, ‘I have an attractive body’; ‘I am sunburnt all over (my body)’. The phrases, ‘I have an 
aching body’, or ‘my body aches all over’, are equivalent expressions, and I can equally say that ‘I 
ache all over’. If I have aches and pains all over my body, my body does not have aches and pains all 
over its body. I am the one who has those aches and pains. Similarly, when Brian says that his body is 
deteriorating, it is he who is deteriorating.  Shaw claims that Brian’s body can be deteriorating, while 
his mind remains intact, and that it therefore makes sense to distinguish him from his body – to say 
that while his body is deteriorating, he is not.30 But this is too hasty. Brian could perfectly well claim, 
without any inaccuracy, that he is becoming frail, or is feeling unwell, and it would make no sense to 
contradict him by saying that, to the extent he remains lucid and alert mentally, these claims are 
false. It makes no sense for a doctor on a ward to reply to Brian by saying, ‘well, Brian, strictly 
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speaking, it is your body that is feeling unwell, rather than you. As long as you have your faculties, 
you are fine’.  Such a response would not only be insensitive; it would be perverse.   
The source of Shaw’s confusion stems from the fact that we speak of having a body, and we are 
inclined to think of this along the lines of having arms and legs, so that, just as arms and legs are part 
of us, so our body is part of us.31 The conclusion that we are something over and above our bodies 
which we ‘have’ then becomes irresistible.  
However, as Hacker has pointed out, it is important here to distinguish between the use of ‘body’ to 
mean a ‘spatio-temporal continuant’ and the use of body to refer, as we have just been doing, to my 
corporeal characteristics.32 In the sense in which I am a spatio-temporal continuant, a self-moving 
human organism, I am my body. I am a living human organism, a natural self-moving substance. But 
I, as that self-moving substance, might refer to some of the characteristics I have by saying such 
things as ‘I have a pale, attractive, or aching body’. ‘Have’ here is not used in the way it is used when 
we speak of possession, but simply as a way of referring to my attributes. And in many cases, the 
things I say of my body can be said of me (‘I’ and ‘my body’ are intersubstitutable in those cases, as 
in ‘I am suntanned all over/my body is suntanned all over’). But in other cases, there is no 
intersubstitutability, where, for example, I might say I have an attractive body. Here, I may not be 
attractive, even if I have an attractive body (eg, I may not have an attractive face).33 Further, it is not 
my body that weeps, feels cheerful or angry, but it is I who does so, the human being.34 We do not, 
for instance, talk about ‘my body’s head of hair’ or ‘my body’s arms’, ‘my body’s legs’. And we do not 
substitute ‘my body ran the 100 metre race’ for ‘I ran the 100 metre race’. Nonetheless, it does not 
follow from this that I am a distinct entity from my body, a mind, rather than an organism. For I am 
the whole human organism, the spatio-temporal continuant which enters the race. And if I am not 
up to the race, that might be because my body is not up to it, because I am not fit enough . Or it 
might be because I am not mentally prepared. Either way, it is I who is not up to the race.   
Conclusion 
If the above arguments are sound, it follows that the parallel Shaw seeks to draw between 
withholding and withdrawing life sustaining measures and euthanasia is misplaced. Our bodies do 
not stand in the same relationship to us as a life-support machine. In one sense of ‘body’, I am my 
body, a living spatio-temporal continuant, a self-moving substance inhabiting the world.  Used in 
that sense, my body does not ‘support’ my life, but is my life; it is me, the living human organism. 
The central difficulty with Shaw’s arguments is that he misconstrues the relationship between me 
and my body and between me and my mind. He incorrectly conceives of me as in a relationship of 
possession of my body, and misidentifies me with my mind. Having made these mistakes, it is very 
easy to see how he has been drawn to make a false analogy between my body and a life-support 
machine. But these mistakes mean that the analogy he seeks to draw between the body and a life 
support machine is awry. Consequently, Shaw’s attempt to reduce the difference between 
withholding or withdrawing and euthanasia is misconceived.  
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